[redacted]

LET US SUPERVISE THE CIA

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, the recent disclosures regarding activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in Singapore are disgraceful. After denying that an agent of the CIA offered a bribe of $3,300,000 some 5 years ago to Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, of Singapore, officials of the State Department a few hours later were forced to make the admission that this had occurred. This following the time Mr. Yew indignantly produced the letter in which Secretary of State Dean Rusk had apologized for the incident. This latest example of CIA bungling raises many questions. Will we ever know just what the CIA has been doing these past years, and how much of our taxpayers' money this agency has been spending?

Mr. President, there was published in the Washington Post of September 7 an excellent article written by Stanley Karnow, staff writer, entitled "U.S. Image in Southeast Asia Suffers From Clumsy Intrigues of Agents," which details CIA activities in southeast Asia which have embarrassed top officials of our Nation over the years. I commend this to my colleagues and ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1965]

ESPIONAGE ATTEMPTS IN THE 1950'S RECALLED—U.S. IMAGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA SUFFERS FROM CLUMSY INTRIGUES OF AGENTS

(By Stanley Karnow)

In a petulant mood one day last week, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew gave an intriguing glimpse into history. Late in 1960, he disclosed, a Central Intelligence Agency operative had offered him a $3-million bribe to conceal a bungled American espionage attempt. The shadowy affair allegedly involved girls, too—or as Lee put it, "like James Bond, only not so good."

On Wednesday, Wisconsin Democrat Clement Zablocki's House subcommittee on foreign affairs is scheduled to begin a closed inquiry into "what happened in Singapore."

But what happened in Singapore, though rather embarrassing, was relatively innocuous compared to an assortment of even clumsier covert efforts of Americans in southeast Asia over the years. For example:

In Burma more than a decade ago, U.S. secret agents striving to influence Burmese political leanings were somehow sidetracked into the more rewarding pursuit of opium trading.

In Cambodia, U.S. secret agents were indirectly involved in an abortive coup d'etat contrived to overthrow Prince Sihanouk's government.

In Indonesia, U.S. secret agents backed a desultory rebellion aimed at undermining President Sukarno.

In Laos, U.S. secret agents' operations ranged from stuffing ballot boxes to bulwarking a full-scale military offensive by insurgents against the country's capital.

None of the operations really succeeded in any significant, long-range sense. Some served to justify local leaders' doubts or hostility toward the United States. And nearly everywhere in southeast Asia, though supposedly clandestine, American covert activities were widely known.

The first of these earnest efforts, back in the 1950's, was focused on the tangled jungles of northwest Burma. Defeated by the Communists in China, bands of Chinese Nationalist troops had retreated into this area, where they became brisk opium traders. It was considered, however, that they might perform a nobler purpose.

As it does now, Burma in those days adhered to a neutralist line. But neutralism, insisted the then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was not only immoral but shortsighted. Thus a scheme was devised to help the Burmese see the light.

The remnant Chinese Nationalists would be inspired to provoke Red China into attacking Burma, thereby forcing the Burmese to seek salvation in the Western camp. Ingenious as it was, though, the plan worked poorly.

For one thing, the Americans assigned to supply the Nationalists with weapons and gold enlisted the aid of Gen. Phao Sriyanod, the police chief of neighboring Thailand. But Phao, a leading narcotics dealer, cared little about international politics. He simply wanted to latch on to the Nationalists' opium.

And under his aegis, an operation originally dedicated to saving Burmese souls soon degenerated into a lucrative narcotics traffic. Aircraft mobilized to supply the Nationalists were mostly employed to transport opium, and several American agents, unable to resist temptation, eagerly joined in the smuggling. Finally, in 1953, Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan went out to Bangkok, ostensibly as U.S. Ambassabor, effectively to clean up the mess.

The whole maneuver, dubiously conceived and artlessly executed, had inevitable repercussions. Blaming the United States for supporting the Chinese Nationalists on their territory, the Burmese renounced American aid and came close to quitting the United Nations. For other motives as well, Burma has since found an accommodation with Communist China more advantageous.

The abortive Burmese experience evidently did not deter further covert efforts, however. In 1958, a somewhat different sort of tactic was initiated against another uncooperative leader, Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Financed by U.S. funds and equipment, a team of South Vietnamese operatives joined Cambodian rebels in attempting to overthrow Sihanouk and replace him with Dap Chuon, then the Cambodian Minister of Security. The plot fell apart when loyal Cambodian troops invaded the rebel headquarters, killed Dap Chuon and discovered among the insurgents a U.S. Information Agency employee.

Only a month before, Sihanouk had publicly praised U.S. aid and denied any intention of flirting with communism. After the plot against him, he promptly recognized Red China and rejected a new offer of American assistance.

About the same time, U.S. operatives began to cast an eye toward Indonesia, where local army commanders scattered across the farflung archipelago were rumbling against President Sukarno's government. Some objected to growing Communist strength; others had regional grievances.

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